By most conventional measures, the United States remains the world’s most competitive economy. It dominates global capital markets, leads in frontier technologies, and continues to define the pace of innovation. The recent McKinsey Global Institute report, At 250: Sustaining America’s Competitive Edge (2026), presents a confident and data-driven account of this enduring position.

Yet beneath its empirical strength lies a deeper concern. The report does not merely describe economic performance; it implicitly advances a narrative. In doing so, it risks conflating competitiveness with legitimacy, and dominance with neutrality.

What is framed as “competitiveness” is not simply an economic condition. It is a political and intellectual construct, one that tends to obscure the structural foundations of American power while underestimating the magnitude of global transformation now underway.

The report rests on a familiar triad: globally leading firms, technological leadership, and economic opportunity. These indicators appear objective, even self-evident. However, they carry an embedded assumption—that the ability to dominate markets is inherently desirable and indicative of systemic success. As Michael Porter’s foundational work on competitive advantage suggests, such frameworks often privilege firm-level efficiency while leaving broader structural asymmetries underexplored (Porter, 1990).

This assumption is far from neutral. It reflects a particular tradition of political economy that privileges efficiency, productivity, and innovation, often at the expense of deeper questions about power, dependency, and distribution. Dani Rodrik (2011) has long warned that globalization narratives frequently mask institutional and political contingencies. Competitiveness, in this sense, becomes less an analytical category and more an ideological lens. It reveals who is winning, but remains silent on how the system itself is structured and who determines its rules.

Equally striking is what the report leaves unaddressed. The United States does not operate within a vacuum. Its economic strength is deeply intertwined with a broader global architecture that reinforces its position. The dominance of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency provides what Barry Eichengreen (2011) calls an “exorbitant privilege,” enabling the United States to sustain deficits and project financial power globally. Likewise, Susan Strange (1988) reminds us that structural power in the global political economy often operates invisibly, shaping the rules of the system rather than merely competing within them.

By focusing predominantly on domestic dynamism, the report risks presenting an incomplete picture. It highlights innovation while overlooking the systemic conditions that make such innovation globally scalable and financially dominant.

The historical narrative offered is similarly elegant, yet overly linear. The progression from agrarian beginnings to industrial power, then to scientific leadership and digital dominance, suggests a story of continuous adaptation. What is less visible are the tensions and ruptures that shaped this trajectory. Economic historians such as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) emphasize that institutional evolution is deeply contested, often emerging from conflict rather than smooth adaptation.

Economic transformation is rarely the product of linear progress. It is forged through disruption, inequality, and political struggle. To present it otherwise is to risk turning history into inevitability rather than contingency.

The treatment of China further illustrates the report’s limitations. While acknowledging China’s rapid technological rise, it frames the country primarily as a competitor within an existing system. This perspective understates the extent to which China represents a systemic alternative.

China’s model of state-led capitalism, combining industrial policy with technological ambition, reflects what scholars such as Yuen Yuen Ang (2016) describe as adaptive governance. This model challenges not only American leadership but also the underlying assumptions of liberal market capitalism. The competition is therefore not merely technological; it is institutional and ideological.

For countries in the Global South, including Indonesia, these dynamics carry significant implications. The report’s implicit suggestion that competitiveness can be achieved through deeper integration into global markets echoes long-standing development prescriptions. Yet dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and later scholars have shown that integration can reproduce structural inequalities rather than resolve them.

Integration has not always translated into structural transformation. Many economies remain locked into roles as suppliers of raw materials, with limited control over value creation. Indonesia’s experience reflects this dilemma. While resource-rich and strategically positioned, it continues to grapple with the challenge of industrial upgrading and technological sovereignty.

Recent efforts in downstream processing, particularly in the nickel sector, suggest a more assertive approach. However, as Ha-Joon Chang (2002) argues, successful industrialization historically requires active state intervention, not merely market participation. This underscores the limits of adopting competitiveness frameworks without adapting them to domestic realities.

In this context, the evolving role of the Global South becomes increasingly important. The Bandung Conference of 1955 symbolized a collective aspiration for autonomy and solidarity. Today, that vision has evolved into a more pragmatic strategy. Countries are no longer strictly non-aligned. Instead, they pursue multiple alignments simultaneously.

Security cooperation with the United States coexists with economic engagement with China, while platforms such as BRICS offer alternative institutional pathways. This reflects what contemporary analysts describe as “hedging strategy,” a rational response to uncertainty in a multipolar world.

This shift underscores a broader transformation. The assumption that there is a single pathway to competitiveness is increasingly untenable. As the global system fragments, resilience, sovereignty, and policy space become as important as efficiency and growth.

The United States may well sustain its economic edge in the years ahead. However, the more fundamental question is not whether it remains competitive, but whether the framework used to measure competitiveness remains adequate.

For Indonesia and the wider Global South, the challenge is not to replicate an external model. It is to navigate a changing system while defining independent pathways to development.

In the end, the central issue is not who leads the global economy. It is who defines the rules by which leadership itself is measured.

References :

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why Nations Fail.

Ang, Y. Y. (2016). How China Escaped the Poverty Trap.

Chang, H.-J. (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder.

Eichengreen, B. (2011). Exorbitant Privilege.

Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America.

McKinsey Global Institute. (2026). At 250: Sustaining America’s Competitive Edge.

Porter, M. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations.

Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox.

Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets.

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